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Abstract
The competing ideals of international human rights and global economic
neoliberalism come into conflict when developing countries try to enforce socioeconomic rights. This paper explores the intersection of economic globalization and the
enforcement of 2nd generation human rights. The focus of this exploration is the right to
water in South Africa, specifically the recent Constitutional Court case Mazibuko v City
of Johannesburg. While a right to water can be constructed at the international level, the
right disappears in the face of neoliberal development measures such as those that are
instituted by democratic governments in developing nations faced with limited resources.
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“The trouble with water – and there is trouble with water –
is that they’re not making any more of it….People,
however, they’re making more of…”
Marq De Villiers

“To deny the applicants the right to water is to deny them
the right to lead a dignified human existence, to live a
South African dream: To live in a democratic, open, caring,
responsive and equal society that affirms the values of
human dignity, equality and freedom.”
Judge M. Tsoka

“The wars of the 21st century will be fought over water.”
Ismail Serageldin
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Introduction
Water is essential to human life. It is also a scarce resource. This impasse is the
beginning of the debate over the nature of water. Every human on Earth needs water to
survive, and yet not every human has access to fresh water. How to guarantee access to
fresh water is only a part of a larger controversy over the duties imposed upon states by
positive human rights. Positive human rights are socio-economic rights, such as the right
to housing, healthcare, and sufficient water. In this thesis, I am disaggregating the issues
surrounding states’ obligations in positive rights by exploring the nature of water. If
water is interpreted as a basic human right that cannot be commodified, then the actor
that is responsible for delivering water to citizens is the state. However, if water is a
commodity, then it can be delivered to consumers through the market. This dialectic
illustrates the extent of states’ responsibilities in fulfilling international socio-economic
rights that could be considered commodities. Water has no close substitutes, and
therefore the method by which it is allocated will have implications for people’s ability to
access water for survival. Understanding the debate over the nature of water is essential
to understanding the complexities surrounding the enforcement of international socioeconomic rights in developing countries that are faced with scarce resources.
There are thirty-six million cubic kilometers of fresh water in the world.1 Yet, the
human demands for fresh water are beginning to outstrip the supply. There is no question
that, “the problem of water supply…will become more political in the twenty-first
century…[I]n an urbanised planet, with nearly eight billion inhabitants by the year 2020,

1

E. C. Pielou, Fresh water (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 2.

water will be as strategically vital for living as petroleum.”2 The population of the world
is facing a global water crisis. This global crisis will be felt mostly in developing
countries that face scarce water resources and structural inequalities. South Africa is the
threshold of the international definition of a country that is “water stressed”.3 However,
access to water has historically been intensely unequal. South Africa first confronted its
“water apartheid” problem in 2002 when faced with 30,000 marchers at the World
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg protesting the privatization of
water services that resulted in unequal access.4 The right to water is enshrined in the
South African Constitution, yet hundreds of thousands of South Africans are without
access to basic water services. This thesis seeks to unravel the impending water crisis
through addressing the viability of an enforceable right to water in South Africa.
There are larger global conversation and debates that frame this thesis. These are
conversations about the enforceability of human rights, global economic development,
and water privatization. These debates are still contested, and so this thesis enters into an
ongoing conversation. In order to frame the academic context for this thesis, it is
important to understand some of the arguments that are being made in these
conversations.
The enforceability of international human rights is debated on a higher level than
will be included in the course of this paper. This debate has to do with the effectiveness
of the current human rights regime, and whether or not non-binding treaties will actually
2

De Rivero 2001; Shiva 2002, quoted in Peter T. Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse
of Water Privatization," Journal of International Development 15 (2003): 1073.
3
In South Africa in 1997, there was just over 1,200 kiloliters of fresh water for each of the 45 million
residents. Michael Kidd, "South Africa: The Development of Water Law," in The Evolution of the Law
and Politics of Water, by Joseph W. Dellapenna and Joyeeta Gupta (New York: Springer, 2009), 87.
4
Patrick Bond and Jackie Dugard, "Water, Human Rights and Social Conflict: South African Experiences,"
Law, Social Justice & Global Development, no. 1 (February 11, 2008): 3.
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lead to the enforcement of human rights.

The neo-realist school of thought casts a

pessimistic shadow on the enforceability of human rights, arguing that weak regimes
without strong incentives for compliance or enforcement mechanisms will not lead to
enforceable human rights. If things happen because powerful countries want them to
happen, as neo-realists reason, then human rights treaties do not seem to be enforceable,
since powerful countries rarely employ punitive mechanisms to coerce other countries
into improving their human rights records.5 The liberal international relations theory
does not view the state as a unitary actor, and therefore believes that human rights
regimes can be effective if internal actors use them to pressure their governments to
conform to human rights standards through lobbying or lawsuits. Thus, the liberal
perspective predicts that enforcement of human rights would be more effective in
democratic countries where the rule of law prevails.6 These are just two of the many
perspectives on the enforceability of human rights through the current regime. This
thesis will primarily engage the liberal ideal, and investigate if the court system in South
Africa can be used to enforce the right to water.
Development can be understood as the “problematic of the transition from
agriculture to industry…or, in a word, industrialization.”7 Conversations about global
economic development span across disciplines, and engage in debates around equity and
sustainability. Two of the ideas that are touched upon in this paper are sustainable
development and neoliberalism. Sustainable development is a concept that has evolved
from the Brundtland Commission to mean creating wealth to meet the needs of the
5

Eric Neumayer, "Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?" The
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 6 (December 2005): 926.
6
Ibid, 930
7
Jan N. Pieterse, "The Development of Development Theory: Towards Critical Globalism," Review of
International Political Economy 3, no. 4 (Winter 1996): 547.

3

present generation without compromising the ability of the future generation to meet their
needs.8 Since the inception of the term, the environment – development complex has
been treated through theories such as ecodevelopment, deep ecology9, and political
ecology.10 Political ecology in sustainable development theory takes on significant
influence in the context of this thesis in its treatment of nature-society relationships in
conditions of the growing polarity in world income and wider political economic factors.
Political ecology has contributed a poststructuralist voice in the development
conversation that is concerned with power and discourse,11 and serves as one of the major
frameworks for the analysis in this thesis.
One of the power structures investigated is the power behind the neoliberal
development model. This model is based on the Washington Consensus, a term coined
by John Williamson. It includes austere fiscal measures that are aimed at attracting
foreign direct investment as a means of economic growth. Proponents of the neoliberal
development method include international financial institutions such as the International
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. However, it has come under heavy scrutiny, with
critics claiming that it does not promote economic growth, it does not allow developing
countries to implement the same protectionist policies that allowed develop countries to
reach their current industrialized state, and that it crowds out other viable development

8

Ellen Walkowiak, "Sustainable development as an Economic Development Strategy," Economic
Development Review (Winter 1996): 75.
9
As coined by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess.
10
See Blakie, “The Political Economy of Soil Erosion” (1985) and Blakie and Brookfield “Land
Degredation and Society” (1987) for early political ecology.
11
Michael Watts and Richard Peet, "Introduction: Development Theory and Environment in an Age of
Market Triumphalism," Economic Geography 69, no. 3 (July 1993): 227.
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options.12 This thesis will engage in the debate over the effectiveness of the neoliberal
development strategy through critically examining effects of privatization.
Privatization of water resources is one of the more contested methods through
which neoliberal development strategies are realized. It is part of a wider debate over
whether or not water is a private good. As Ben Page describes, “In the war of ideas
around global water management the battle lines have, increasingly, been drawn around
whether or not water ought to be treated as a commodity”.13 Those in favor of
privatization of water argue that privatizing water is the best method to ensure efficient
delivery and allocation. Those against privatization cite equity concerns and the ethical
implications of treating a basic human need as a private commodity. This debate is
further expanded upon in the body of this thesis through a discussion over the nature of
water and investigation of the effects of privatization in South Africa.
The central question that drives my thesis is: Is the right to water enforceable?
This thesis will be divided into four chapters. The first two chapters will review the
literature on either side of the debate over the nature of water. Chapter One explains the
origins of the idea of water as a commodity, and illustrates how water is commodified
through two examples. The first is the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, wherein water
is sold to South Africa by Lesotho. This case sets the scene for later examples, and
serves as a geographical and historical introduction to the South African government’s
dealings with international neoliberal economic institutions such as the World Bank. The
second example is the use of prepayment water meters in Johannesburg. I argue that

12

Ha-Joon Chang and Ilene Grabel, "Reclaiming Development from the Washington Consensus," Journal
of Post Keynesian Economics 27, no. 2 (Winter 2004-2005)
13
Ben Page, “Paying for water and the geography of commodities,” Transactions of the Institute of British
Geographers 30, (2005): 294
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these meters are indicative of market environmentalism and neoliberal development
policies implemented by the South African government after the fall of apartheid.
Chapter Two is a review of international law wherein I argue that an international human
right to water can be constructed out of existing human rights documents. Chapter Three
is the heart of the thesis. In this chapter I reviewed the text of the South African
Constitutional Court case Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg at every juridical level on
which it was heard. I compared the texts of the decisions, and analyzed the reasoning and
language used to interpret if the courts view water as a human right or a commodity.
Mazibuko is the first case concerning the right to water to reach the highest court in a
country, and therefore sets an important precedent concerning the possibility of
enforcement. This decision represents a new development in the field of water rights, as
the Constitutional Court handed it down in October of 2009. The South African
Constitutional Court is internationally cited and respected for its progressive enforcement
of human rights. South Africa in general offers a unique setting for the meeting of
international human rights law as enshrined in the Constitution and neoliberal economics
embodied in the economy and long-term interactions with the World Bank. This context
makes for a vibrant space to explore the consequences of the meeting of human rights
and neoliberalism in the enforcement of socio-economic rights. By the end of this thesis,
I will conclude that the right to water can be constructed on an international level, yet is
juridically unenforceable in South Africa.

6

Chapter One: Economic Globalization and Water Privatization
Economic globalization and the ideas of neoliberalism14 have produced the
discourse of water as an economic good. The 1992 Dublin Conference on Water and
Environment laid down the definition of water as an economic good for the first time.
Principle Four of the statement that was produced by the conference states: “water has an
economic value, and should be recognized as an economic good, while also maintaining
that access to clean water and sanitation at affordable prices are fundamental human
rights.”15 States and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank, have
chosen to focus mostly on the economic value aspect of this definition, as even the
portion about human rights maintains that it is primarily an economic item. The UN
Panel on Water declared in 1998 that water should be paid for as a commodity rather than
treated as an essential resource to be provided for free.16 This definition has led to a
discourse of privatization in which the private sector is believed to be the most efficient
venue to deliver water services to the public.17 Privatization “is a nebulous term, although
unambiguous in political origin and coincides with the rise of neoliberalism…for the
proponents of privatization it is the very incarnation of the liberal project.”18 In this way,
privatization of water and its definition as an economic good is a result of the global
neoliberal project.

14

Neoliberalism will be taken to mean a “model of capitalism whose underlying principles include the
primacy of economic growth, the opening of borders to capital movements, the removal of all restrictions
to trade and the removal of government regulations which infringe on the operation of an open and free
global market” Harry J. Stephan, Angus F. Hervey, and Raymond S. Fonseca, The scramble for Africa in
the 21st century: a view from the South (Cape Town: Renaissance Press, 2006), 227.
15
Dublin Conference, quoted in Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water
Privatization” p.1077.; Sagie Narsiah, "Discourses of Privatisation: The Case of South Africa's Water
Sector," Development Southern Africa 25 (2008): 30.
16
Bond and Dugard, "Water, Human Rights and Social Conflict"p.6
17
Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water Privatization,"p.1078, 1080
18
Narsiah, "Discourses of Privatisation” p. 22
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One of the central assumptions that paved the way for this definition is that
governments, particularly in the Global South, are unable to deliver the necessary water
infrastructure due to inefficiency and corruption. Therefore, international financial
institutions and regional development banks have shifted their focus to encouraging
governments to manage water resources through the private sector because it is believed
to be more efficient and therefore more sustainable.19 Privatization uses the language of
sustainability to construct “a subjective reality. And, indeed, privatisation produces
particular forms of disciplinary conduct or, as Foucault…conceptualised it,
“governmentality.”20 The practical application of this discursive strategy comes in
foreign direct investment (FDI) by transnational corporations (TNCs) in the water sector,
and neoliberal development strategies used by developing countries.
Though neoclassical economic arguments assert that water is allocated more
efficiently through the private sector,21 there is a contrary theory known as the “global
reach argument.” This logic is based on the idea that FDI is a part of the strategy of
globalizing firms as opposed to a simple resource flow. TNCs become global institutions
that actively produce imperfect markets in order to increase profits. Instead of increasing
efficiency in water delivery and infrastructure, they “reduce it by making markets less
perfect as a result of their own need to control, reduce, or eliminate competition and
maximise surplus profits.”22 Thus, the constructed reality of efficiency that is conveyed in
the discourse of privatization could be seen to as a means to the neoliberal goal of profit
maximization. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has yet to rule on issues of water
19

Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water Privatization,"p.1074
Narsiah, "Discourses of Privatisation,” p.22
21
Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water Privatization,"p.1075; Narsiah,
"Discourses of Privatisation,” p.22
22
Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water Privatization," p.1075
20
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privatization, specifically bulk water exports. However, it has traditionally upheld
economic interests over environmental and human rights concerns.23 The WTO disallows
obstacles to the trade of commodities. If water continues to be defined as a commodity, it
is entirely possible that the WTO will not wish to stop the sale of water.24
Economic globalization in the form of neoliberalism has produced a discourse of
privatization and commodification of water, which has affected the governmentality of
water management. Water supply has been fundamental in the internal politics of
African state-craft, and neoliberal discourses have affected the way in which water policy
is formed in these developing countries. Governments in Southern Africa are under
increasing pressure to apply “integrated water resource management approaches which
strive for economic growth within natural resource availability constraints. According to
Dr. Larry Swatuk, the director of the International Development Program at the
University of Waterloo, this approach often leads to deepening inequalities in water use
and worsening resource degradation.25 The privatization of basic services, including
water, became a serious option for municipalities in South Africa during the 1990s when
government restructuring made financially sustainable basic service programs
untenable.26 Johannesburg privatized its municipal water service in 2001 with a new
municipal entity, called Johannesburg Water, completely owned by the City of
Johannesburg, but fully corporatized and operating under private laws. Johannesburg
23

Naser Faruqui, "Balancing between the Eternal Yesterday and the Eternal Tomorrow: Economic
Globalization, Water, and Equity," in Rethinking water management: innovative approaches to
contemporary issues, by Caroline Figuères, Johan Rockström, and Cecilia Tortajada (London: Earthscan
Publications, 2003), 57.
24
Aaron T. Wolf, "The Present and Future of Transboundary Water Management," in Rethinking water
management: innovative approaches to contemporary issues, by Caroline Figuères, Johan Rockström, and
Cecilia Tortajada (London: Earthscan Publications, 2003), 175.
25
Swatuk qtd in Joost Fontein, "The Power of Water: Landscape, Water, and the State in Southern and
Eastern Africa: An Introduction," Journal of Southern African Studies 34 (2008): 741.
26
Narsiah, "Discourses of Privatisation,” p.22
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Water entered into a five-year management contract with Suez Environment, a
multinational water management company that operated worldwide. The objectives of
this management contract were to make Johannesburg Water into a professionally run
and efficient corporatized utility that is financially viable (not dependent on subsidies or
budget transfers from the City) without drastic increases in water tariffs.27 The effects of
the privatization of water services in Johannesburg is further illustrated below in the
discussion of pre-paid water meters as a means of fully recovering costs, and in Chapter
4, which discusses the case Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg, wherein the prepayment
meters were challenged on Constitutional grounds.

1.1 Market Environmentalism
One of the ways that neoliberal development strategies have entered the realm of
developing-country economic policy is through market environmentalism. Karen Bakker
defines market environmentalism as:
[A] virtuous vision of fusion of economic growth, efficiency, and
environmental conservation: through establishing private property rights,
employing markets as allocation mechanisms, and incorporating
environmental externalities through pricing, proponents of market
environmentalism assert that environmental goods will be more efficiently
allocated if treated as economic goods – thereby simultaneously
addressing concerns over environmental degradation and inefficient use of
resources.28
Supporters of market environmentalism in the water sector argue that water is an
increasingly scarce resource which must be priced at full economic and environmental
cost if is it going to be allocated efficiently to its highest value uses. They argue that
27

Jean-Pierre Mas, "The Need to Reconcile Efficiency and Equity - The Johannesburg Case Study," MS
IWA-1212R1, JOWAM - Johannesburg Water Management, Johannesburg.
28
Karen Bakker, "The "Commons" Versus the "Commodity": Alter-globalization, Anti-privatization and
the Human Right to Water in the Global South," Antipode (2007): 432.
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water must be managed by private companies that are accountable to customers. This
will be more efficient and effective than management by municipalities, whose
accountability comes from citizen-elected representatives, and are much slower to
respond. Opponents of market environmentalism in the water sector argue that water is a
resource that is essential for life and has no substitutes. They say that water is a human
right, which they argue places a burden on the state to provide free water and precludes
private sector involvement.29
The following case studies illustrate market environmentalism in South Africa.
The first is the case of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, which is framed as a
sustainable development project by the World Bank. The second is the installation of
prepayment water meters in Johannesburg, a practice that has been described as a watersaving measure by Suez-run Johannesburg Water. In these two cases, it is possible to see
the effects of market environmentalism in South African water policy, both on the
international and municipal scale.

1.1.1. Lesotho Highlands Water Project
The Orange River originates in Lesotho and runs through South Africa, creating a
border with Namibia before finally emptying into the Atlantic Ocean. The Lesotho
Highlands Water Project is a product of a deal brokered between the apartheid
government of South Africa and a military government in Lesotho in 1986. It was
conceived as a plan to export water on an unprecedented scale from Lesotho to South
Africa’s industrial heartland of Johannesburg and Pretoria. It was accomplished by

29

Bakker, "The ‘Commons’ Versus the ‘Commodity’," p.432
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storing the water in the Orange River and channeling it northward through a 115 km-long
tunnel. A secondary aim was to provide Lesotho with a source of hydroelectricity.30 The
project began with the construction of the Katse Dam (Phase 1A), and the first phase was
completed in 1997 with the aid of international organizations, including the World Bank.
The second phase of the project (Phase 1B) was appraised by the World Bank in 1996,
after the first phase was finished. The remaining phases of the LHWP are seen as an
important development project by the government of South Africa that will bring badly
needed resources to the water-poor Gauteng province, the province where Johannesburg
is located. President Mandela described South Africa’s post-apartheid position on the
project: “We in South Africa need the water from the LHWP to meet the increase in our
demand, and, in particular, to meet the needs of previously neglected communities.”31 It
is exhibited by the government as a project that will benefit the poor of South Africa and
Lesotho through the help of the World Bank and transnational corporations that promote
the sustainable use of the Orange River basin while stimulating development.
The way in which the project has been framed by the World Bank and the South
African government has shaped the way that people view and act toward it. The actors
involved in the LHWP have shaped the way it is described to reflect the global
environmental ideal of sustainable development, an ideal that can be contradictory to (but
is not necessarily in opposition to) neoliberalism. In other words, they have used the
language of market environmentalism to describe the Project. These actors include the
World Bank on the supply-side and transnational corporations, which manage the

30

Korinna Horta, "The Mountain Kingdom's White Oil," The Ecologist, 6th ser. (November 12, 1995):
227.
31
Mandela, quoted in Patrick Bond, Unsustainable South Africa: environment, development and social
protest (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002), 128.
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demand-side of the project. They have used this discourse to describe the way in which
the infrastructure introduced as a result of the project will impact people’s lives.
Neoliberal discourses and motives are hidden behind the sustainable development
rhetoric. This is inevitable given the current global economic situation and the common
definition of water as an economic good.32 The World Bank and TNCs use sustainable
development discourse in the case of the LHWP to strike a balance between growth and
global distributive justice,33 and thus to appeal to all interest groups involved in the
Lesotho and South African sides of the project.
The World Bank’s involvement in the LHWP has been extensive from the
beginning. The Bank took the role of “central organiser of technical, financial, social and
ecological information about the LHWP, and will continue in this vein in the future.”34
Although the original loan was given to Lesotho, it was only the nominal borrower. South
Africa was actually responsible for repaying the debt and servicing the loans, though at
the time of the original loan, they were the subject of economic sanctions and therefore
not technically allowed to be a recipient of loans.35 Due to the political climate at the
time, it appears that the project was originally “in-part a sanctions-busting, prestige
project with…geo-political overtones,”36 which necessitated the involvement of the
World Bank at a high level of governance of the project and therefore of the
transboundary watercourse that resulted. The Bank and its Inspection Panel moved into a
role of “bureaucratic rationality” that is traditionally associated with the nation-state.37

32

Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water Privatization," p.1074
Harvey, quoted in Bond, Unsustainable South Africa, p.162
34
Bond, Unsustainable South Africa, p.136
35
Horta, "The Mountain Kingdom's White Oil," p.228
36
Bond, Unsustainable South Africa p.162
37
Bond, Unsustainable South Africa, p.162
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The fact that the World Bank had taken on this role makes the language they used of
primary importance for the outcome and impacts of the project. A closer inspection of the
actions of the World Bank and its subsidiaries shows that the sustainable development
discourse was driven by economic concerns and was working in concert with a neoliberal
agenda rooted in an understanding of water as a commodity.
The aim of the LHWP is to divert about 40 percent of the water in the Senqu
River basin into South Africa’s Vaal River system in Gauteng province, where the water
would then go to the area around Johannesburg.38 This is to be achieved by a system of
five dams and a tunnel to the Vaal, altering the natural course of the Orange/Senqu River.
The LHWP adopted the Bank’s “Operational Directive on Environmental Impacts,”
which requires a thorough investigation of possible environmental consequences,
including human health and safety.39 However, no impact assessment was done for Phase
1A. Under pressure following the devastating environmental and social impacts of Phase
1A, an Environmental Impact Assessment was mandated for all aspects of Phase 1B as
well as the entire project. Despite the acknowledgement of transboundary impacts by the
Environmental Impact Assessment team, no Transboundary Impact Assessment was
carried out. The reason for this oversight was that “[The World Bank] feared that
assessing these impacts would severely delay implementation of Phase 1B.”40 Had they
conducted the assessment, they would have found that a fully implemented LHWP would
give the Lower Orange River an irregular flow, disrupting the livelihoods of those living
38

Lori Pottinger. "A Brief History of Africa’s Largest Water Project | International Rivers." International
Rivers. http://www.internationalrivers.org/en/africa/brief-history-africa-s-largest-water-project (accessed
March 29, 2009).
39
Nico Willemse, "Actual versus Predicted Transbounday Impact: A Case Study of Phase 1B of the
Lesotho Highlands Water Project," International Journal of Water Resources Development 23, 3rd ser.
(2007): 459.
40
Willemse, "Actual versus Predicted Transbounday Impact,” p.460
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in the other riparian nations.41 This dramatic change in the river system is unsustainable
in the long run, as many ecosystems and communities downstream depend on the river.
Disrupting the flow of the Orange River can be ecologically disastrous at every level, as
dry land biota are also specifically adapted to the natural flow cycles of the river and
depend on the regular delivery of water.42 Socially, the project will also have large
impacts, as large-scale water projects are more likely to negatively affect communities
living downstream than those living in the project area.43 Downstream communities, if
adequately informed of the impact of the project, could have demanded compensation for
their losses. However, this concession would have lessened the economic benefits of the
project to South Africa, making the project a more expensive option.44 A “sustainable
development” project would have had to meet the standards of impact assessment that the
World Bank itself has mandated. In this case, it failed to do so, which brings into
question the sustainability of the project.
Another example of the lack of truly sustainability-focused action on the part of
the World Bank is the fact that it did not conduct an adequate assessment of demand-side
management options before funding the new supply-side infrastructure. Recent data
shows that the project was not necessary at the time that it was implemented. The South
African Department of Water Affairs admitted that no new supply of water is needed in
Gauteng until 2025.45 In addition, the planners at Rand Water, the water supplier in
Gauteng, suggested that the project could have been delayed 17–20 years if effective
41

Anne Marie De Jonge Schuermans, Jacob Helbing, and Roman Fedosseev, "Evaluation of Success and
Failure in the International Water Management: Orange River Basin, South Africa," ETH Zurich (2004):
10.
42
Willemse, "Actual versus Predicted Transbounday Impact,” p.460
43
Horta, "The Mountain Kingdom's White Oil," p.230
44
De Jonge Schuermans et al, "Evaluation of Success and Failure,” p.13
45
De Jonge Schuermans et al, "Evaluation of Success and Failure," p.11
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demand-side management (DSM) projects had been implemented.46 In response to this
evidence, the World Bank argued that postponing the Mohale Dam would increase
construction costs.47 In choosing to invest in infrastructure that will cause ecological and
social harm without investigating whether or not the project is actually needed, the World
Bank has contradicted its sustainable development rhetoric, bringing to light the
neoliberal drivers that lie beneath the discourse of sustainability.

1.1.2 Johannesburg Water
On the South African side, management of the water that has been transferred
from the Orange River to the Vaal is delegated to private companies that are supported by
transnational corporations. The failure of the state to provide adequate infrastructure has
led the World Bank to strongly encourage the use of the private sector to allocate
resources.48 This is market environmentalism on the municipal scale. The two main
corporations that use LHWP water are Rand Water and Johannesburg Water. For the
purpose of this essay, I focus on Johannesburg Water and its operations in Soweto, one of
the townships of Johannesburg that supposedly benefits from the LHWP.49 Specifically, I
investigate the use of prepaid meters and water tariffs that are justified through the logic
of market environmentalism, which will later be contrasted with the idea of water as an
enforceable human right through the discussion of the South African Constitutional Court
case Maziuko v City of Johannesburg.
46
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Johannesburg Water Pty, Ltd. was created as an independent company, with the
city of Johannesburg as the sole shareholder. The transnational corporation Suez Water
was awarded a five-year management contract with the idea that corporatization of the
water sector would increase efficiency and Suez Water would introduce sanctioned
business practices into water management and provision. Part of this process was strict
enforcement of full-cost recovery beyond the 6,000 liters per month of free water
mandated by the Free Basic Water Policy, a 2002 policy that established a basic amount
of free water that should be available to all South Africans. This enforcement led to water
shutoffs in Soweto, one of Johannesburg’s poorest townships.50 The World Bank insists
that supplying clean water to the poor can be done through the private sector, but
evidence suggests that enforcing full-cost recovery allows the rich to use as much water
as they like while the poor continue to suffer from lack of access.51 Johannesburg Water
uses pre-paid meters to enforce full-cost recovery, and they justify this through market
environmentalism. The introduction of prepayment meters began with a public awareness
campaign, Operation Gcin’amanzi, to educate citizens on how to stay within the 6,000
liters a month through water conservation measures, emphasizing that having to pay for
the extra water would be the result of wasteful use.52 This process conflated the issues of
full-cost recovery and sustainability.
The LHWP caused an increase in the price of water because part of the financing
plan was to have the end-users pay the increased cost. The end-user, Rand Water and
Johannesburg Water, passed this cost on to the consumer through price increases. As

50

Antina Von Schnitzler, "Citizenship Prepaid: Water, Calculability, and Techno-Politics in South Africa,"
Journal of Southern African Studies 34 (2008): 903.
51
Robbins, "Transnational Corporations and the Discourse of Water Privatization," p.1078
52
Von Schnitzler, "Citizenship Prepaid,“ p.904

17

prices rose, the ability of municipalities to collect payments from low-income residents,
such as those in Soweto, fell.53 The use of pre-paid meters not only implemented full-cost
recovery under the ideas of market environmentalism, but it changed the residents’
relationship with the state and water accessibility. During the apartheid era, nonpayment
for services was one of the only means by which township residents could protest the
state. Having to pay for water before use eliminated this channel of protest, therefore
changing their relationship with the state and limiting expressions of agency. Von
Schnitzler argues, “neoliberal reforms are seen to hinge on the construction of new forms
of agency and, indeed, to work through the promotion of new conceptions and practices
of citizenship.”54 The introduction of pre-paid meters under the vocabulary of
sustainability, and the implementation of full-cost recovery through privatization, turned
water into a measureable commodity and transformed the residents’ relationship with the
state. The meters force residents to calculate how much water they are using and attach a
monetary value, turning water into an exchangeable commodity. Their agency and
relationship to the state is expressed through their ability to manage and purchase water
as such.55 The language of sustainability that Johannesburg Water uses to justify the prepaid meters does not fully encompass the impact that it has had on the concept of water
and citizenship in Soweto. It appears to be a thin veil over the economic considerations
that drive the use of pre-paid meters to achieve full-cost recovery.
Chapter Three will delve further into the introduction of prepayment meters in
Soweto, and cut to the crux of the tension between neoliberal development policies,
scarce resources, and human rights in South Africa. This chapter will provide some
53
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background for, and then follow the arguments of the Constitutional Court case Mazibuko
v City of Johannesburg, wherein Soweto residents challenged the introduction of the
prepayment meters as unconstitutional, asserting that they have a right to free water.
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Chapter Two: The International Right to Water
There is a central tension between the view of water as an economic good and an
international humanitarian perspective that sees water as a human right. The tension
between these two views has increased as globalization has expanded, bringing with it
multinational corporations such as Suez and national neoliberal reforms which have led
to privatized water resources in developing countries. Opponents of water privatization
argue that introducing the logic of the market into water management is incompatible
with guaranteeing basic rights to water, and invoke a human rights approach to support
their claims.56 Water is essential for life and the fulfillment of other human rights, yet
there is no explicit right to water in the major international human rights instruments.
This section argues that the right to water can be constructed from other rights, as well as
from less prominent documents and statements from the Committee on Economic and
Social Rights. First, I will review the major international human rights covenants and
highlight the portions that support the right to water. In the review of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, I will discuss the Committee’s
General Comment 15, which explains the right to water. Then, I will highlight relevant
regional covenants that support the human right to water in Africa. Finally, I will discuss
mechanisms for the enforcement of this right.

1.1 International Covenants
Three international covenants dominate the literature surrounding human rights:
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
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Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The right to water is not explicitly protected in any of these
documents. However an argument can be made that water is a necessary precondition to
the fulfillment of other rights. Scholars who argue for the existence of a right to water
have based arguments in each of these documents.

1.1.1 UDHR
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, and articulated
the basic ideas of human rights, including universality and internationalism. There are
three provisions in this document that can be used to construct a right to water. Article 3,
which states “everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person”, Article 22
provides that everyone have a right to “realization…of the economic, social and cultural
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality”, and
Article 25, which provides for every person to have the “right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family”.57 The wording of
Article 25 makes clear that the list of specific provisions, such as food and housing, were
not meant to be all inclusive, but representative of the sorts of provisions that would
allow people an adequate standard of living. One of the essential components not listed
is water, as satisfying the conditions of Article 25 would not be possible without the use
of water. Water is an underlying requirement to satisfy the rights protected under the
Articles listed. Logic suggests that the framers of the UDHR would have considered
water to be implicitly needed in order to meet the right that they described. The right to
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air is also not included, yet no one would deny how fundamental air is to human
existence and the realization of human rights. 58
These two articles are seen to be a basis for the right to water, as water is a
precondition to realize these rights. The UDHR is not binding upon states, and therefore
neither are the two articles that imply a right to water.59 The subsequent covenants, the
ICCPR and ICESCR, are not binding upon states either, but the ICCPR does contain
enforcement mechanisms and the ICESCR has been clarified to include the right to water.
Therefore, these documents can serve as stronger bases upon which to place the right to
water.

1.1.2 ICCPR
A basic supply of fresh water is essential to sustaining human life. It is possible
that a right to water can be implied under Article 6 (1) ICCPR, which states: “Every
human being had the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”60 The right to life is subject to well-developed
international enforcement mechanisms, and countries subject to the First Optional
Protocol have a strict duty of compliance. Article 6(1) is generally understood to be
enforceable under national legal systems, if the given state has enacted such legislation,
therefore if the right to water could be implied under this article, it would carry
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significant weight. 61 However, the ICCPR is generally understood to contain negative
rights, and the subsequent duty on the state is to not interfere. Therefore, “it follows that
article 6(1) ICCPR does not require a states party to take positive steps in order to ensure
its citizens’ access to life-sustaining resources, but is limited to the state obligation to
refrain from arbitrary deprivations of life”.62 Kiefer and Brölmann support a broader
vision of the right to life, one that imposes a duty on states to preserve life and promote
the right to live. This would put states in a position where they would have to provide
every citizen with the basic means of subsistence and a decent standard of life. Kiefer
and Brölmann write: “…the right to life in its modern meaning should be understood as
belonging to both the realm of civil and political rights, and that of economic, social, and
cultural rights; a view which incidentally provides an eloquent illustration of both the
indivisibility and interrelatedness of all human rights”.63 According to this reasoning, the
right to life would encompass positive subsistence rights such as the right to water.
Finding the right to water under the right to life would greatly expand the scope of
Article 6 (1), which has been treated by states parties exclusively as a duty of noninterference. There is little evidence that states would support such a liberal
interpretation; the article is read as a right to life, not a safeguard on all life. Human life
itself is not protected by law, what is protected is the right to not have life arbitrarily
taken. Keifer and Brölmann admit that “In the context of freshwater as a survival
requirement, article 6(1) ICCPR cannot conclusively be considered to go beyond the
evident negative guarantee against water being employed as a means for arbitrary
61
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deprivations of life”.64 The ICCPR can be used to construct a right to water, but it is a
weak base.

1.1.3 ICESCR
The ICESCR protects and promotes positive socio-economic and cultural rights,
and serves as a much stronger basis for a constructed right to water. The juridical basis
for the right to water can be derived from Articles 11 and 12. Article 11 recognizes “the
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, clothing and
housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions”, and Article 12
enshrines the “right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health”.65 While these two articles do not expressly mention the
right to water, water is a necessary precondition to the fulfillment of these rights.66 As
with the UDHR, water is a derivative right that can be logically inferred based on the
stated contents of these articles.67
Economic, social, and cultural rights are a stronger basis for the right to water
than civil and political rights, as they are regarded as welfare rights. Welfare rights
impose positive duties on the state to promote and fulfill the content of the right. The
realization of these rights depends largely upon state intervention.68 State intervention can
take three forms; to respect, protect, and fulfill. A state’s duty to respect a right is
essentially a negative duty of non-interference similar to the duties imposed by the
64
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ICCPR. The duty to protect refers to the state’s obligation to prevent third parties from
interfering with the enjoyment of the right in question. Fulfillment of rights is a last
resort, and can be broken down into facilitating the realization of the right, and providing
the content of the right itself. The duty to facilitate can also be understood as the duty to
promote. In the case of the right to water, promotion of the right would take the form of
providing sufficient information and education for people to realize the right. The use of
water saving practices and technologies may also be important where indigent citizens
are restricted to a small amount of water.69 Provision of resources, such as providing
water free of charge, only occurs when citizens are unable to access the content of the
right themselves.70 In the case of the right to water, the last resort is providing a basic
amount of free water to those who cannot pay.
An advantage to basing the legal right to water in economic, social and cultural
rights is the idea of a “minimum core” content to this type of right. The core content of a
right is the “essential elements of the right, without which it loses its significance”.71
Implicit in the idea of a minimum core is a basic amount of water that would be needed in
order to meet requirements for certain human and ecological functions. Peter Gleick
writes: “A true minimum human need for water can only be defined as the amount
needed to maintain human survival, approximately 3-5 l per day. However, setting a
minimum at this level would have little meaning: except in accidental rare circumstances,
no one dies solely from a lack of water and studies show improvement in human health
can be realized by increasing amounts of clean water up to about 20 l per person per
69
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day”. 72 This number is in line with amounts that have been recommended by the
USAID, the World Bank, the WHO, and the standards from the UN International
Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade and Agenda 21 of the Earth Summit. The
international consensus then, is that 20 liters of water per person per day is the minimum
core content of the right to water.

1.1.4 General Comment 15
The UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights confirmed that the
right to water is implied in the ICESCR in its General Comment no. 15, entitled “The
Right to Water (Articles 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on Economic Social and
Cultural Rights)”. In this document, the Committee defines the right to water as: “the
right of everyone to have at his or her disposal sufficient clean, acceptable, accessible and
obtainable water for personal and domestic uses”. The Committee argued that the right
to water is included in Article 11 of the ICESCR, as the text of the right is such that the
bases for an adequate standard of living are not exhaustive.73 Some, but not all, of the
bases for adequate living are listed in the document. Water is among the bases not listed,
but it is integral to those listed such as food and shelter. As A.E. Irujo wrote, “It is not a
question of linking the right to water with an economic or social activity but of providing
the elements for the development of life under basic conditions that are minimal (but
sufficient) in terms of quality”.74 The Comment establishes a state obligation to realize
the right to water, and to move as quickly and efficiently as possible towards the full
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realization of this right. States are obligated to prevent the infringement of this right by
third party actors, including private water companies.75 This point is important, as it
reflects the tension between water privatization and state protection of human rights.
That the Committee specifically mentions protection of rights against private water
companies implies that they view privatization as a potential obstacle to the full
realization of the right to water.
Although the ICESCR and General Comment no. 15 serve as convincing bases
for the international right to water, neither of these documents are binding upon states.
States are only obligated to take steps within their resources to reach the goals outlined in
these documents, essentially giving them free rein to implement these rights as they
will.76

1.2 Regional Covenants
Regional human rights covenants are not covered in the literature that I reviewed
for the purpose of this paper, however they can serve as compelling bases for a legal right
to water. In the South African case that will be thoroughly discussed later in this work,
Judge Tsoka of the High Court cites two African regional human rights documents.
Given that Judge Tsoka places his interpretation of this right partially in these documents,
it is a worthwhile exercise to investigate how they protect the right to water.
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1.2.1 African Charter
The African Charter of Human and People’s Right, created in 1981and also
known as the Banjul Charter, guarantees everyone the “right to enjoy the best attainable
state of physical and mental health.”77 This is similar to Article 12 of the ICESCR, which
was found by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to be a basis for
the right to water. The African Commission on Human Rights found that failing to
provide basic services, such as water, is a violation of this article.78 South Africa has
signed and ratified this Charter, as well as the Protocol on the Establishment of an
African Court on Human and People’s Rights. The African Court on Human and
People’s Rights is a regional court that rules on states’ compliance with the Banjul
Charter. That South Africa has ratified both the Charter in 1996 and the Protocol in 2002
means that it is subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, and therefore can be held accountable
to the provisions of the Charter. This enforcement mechanism makes the Charter a
strong base for the right to water in the states party to it.

1.2.2 African Convention on Rights of the Child
The African Convention on the Rights of the Child (ACRC) is the other regional
convention that is mentioned by Judge Tsoka in his decision. Article 14 concerns health
and health services. This article reflects Article 16 of the Banjul Charter, and goes a step
further in saying:
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2. State Parties to the present Charter shall undertake to pursue the full
implementation of this right and in particular shall take measures: …
(c) to ensure the provision of adequate nutrition and safe drinking water79
This convention was signed and ratified by South Africa, and specifically highlights the
right to safe water. While there is no enforcement mechanism for this convention that is
equivalent to the African Court, the explicit mention of safe drinking water serves to
clarify the meaning of physical and mental health that is enshrined in the Banjul Charter.
The Articles are very close to one another in content, and the ACRC was written in 1990
and adopted in South Africa in 2002. The ACRC is nine years younger than the Banjul
Charter was written, and was adopted by South Africa six years later than the Charter was
adopted. Based on the similarity between the two articles, as well as the clarification by
the African Commission that the provision of basic services is included in Article 16, it is
possible to see that the ACRC is a logical continuation of the Banjul Charter. Therefore,
the explicit mention of safe water in the ACRC serves to strengthen the legal basis for a
right to water under the Charter.

1.3 Enforcement
One of the major problems with basing a right to water in international human
rights documents is that these documents are not binding upon states. Therefore, it is
difficult for the international community to enforce of the rights guaranteed in the
documents. The ICCPR has an Optional Protocol that allows individuals to make
complaints for quasi-judicial review, but the ICESCR has no such resource. Given that
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the ICESCR is a stronger basis for the right to water, this section will investigate possible
enforcement mechanisms for the right to water as found under the ICESCR.

1.3.1 International Monitoring
There is no procedure for individuals to make a complaint based on the ICESCR,
as is allowed by the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. The rights guaranteed under the
ICESCR can be seen as vague, as there is no body of case law to clarify the content of the
rights. However, given the recent clarification of rights through the General Comments,
as well as developments in the academic literature such as the Limburg Principles and the
Maastricht Guidelines, it is becoming more difficult for states to argue that the
expectations of the ICESCR are unclear. Kiefer and Brölmann argue that there is no
reason why the right to water should not be subject to quasi-juridical enforcement, and
suggest a method by which to enforce it. They offer an “integrated approach”, used by
the Human Rights Committee in the past to assert that the non-discrimination clause of
article 26 of the ICCPR is also applicable to social, economic, or cultural rights. That is
to say “…if a state party to the ICCPR, the First Optional Protocol and the ICESCR seeks
to implement the right to water as implied in the ICESCR through legislation, and the
national law were to prove discriminatory in the sense of article 26 ICCPR, the injured
individual in principle would have recourse to the individual complaints procedure under
the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR”.80 This could offer possibilities for
enforcement that are greater than the current system of state reporting, but the judgment
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would still be under article 26, not under the right to water. Therefore, the right to water
would not actually be enforced under this system.

1.3.2 Justiciability
The international covenants encourage states parties to adopt their tenets into
domestic law. Domestic legislation that incorporates the rights contained in the ICESCR
would make those rights justiciable on the national level. There are several advantages to
a justiciable right to water. First, the ability to enforce the right to water in courts would
act as a check against government and corporate interests that could interfere with
citizen’s ability to access basic water. This balance of power is particularly important in
the face of increasing instances of privatized water companies operating at full-cost
recovery. Second, it would send the message to the nation that socio-economic rights are
as important as civil and political rights, and should be approached with equal respect.
Third, justiciability would allow national courts and tribunals to practically apply and
therefore clarify the meaning of water rights in different contexts.81 A body of case law
could be compiled to guide future decisions about water rights, and the meaning of
“progressive realization” could become more concrete.
Until recently, the only court cases concerning the right to water had been decided
in lower national courts. The first water rights case to reach the highest court in a state is
Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg, which was decided by the South African
Constitutional Court in October of 2009. This was the most significant test of the
justiciability of water rights to date. This case also contains important themes concerning
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the tension between the right to water, scarce resources, and the neoliberal development
scheme of the South African government. The next chapter will delve into the
circumstances surrounding the Mazibuko case, and trace the case as it moved up through
the South African court system. Mazibuko is at the intersection of competing
development ideals, and thus serves as an important case study for the consequences of
the intersection between human rights, scarcity, and economic globalization.
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Chapter Three: Mazibuko
Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg was the first case concerning the human right to
water to reach the highest court in a state. The progressive history of the Constitution of
South Africa and the Constitutional Court underpin the importance of this case to the
future of a justiciable right to water. Essentially, some of the residents of Phiri, a
neighborhood in Soweto, claimed that the introduction of prepaid water meters under
Johannesburg Water’s Operation Gcin’amanzi was unconstitutional. In order to fully
delve into the issues that this case addressed in its three hearings on different levels of the
South African court system, it is essential to understand the setting in which this case
took place. To this end, I will provide a brief overview of the water policies in South
Africa, the procedural issues when approaching a case based on the Constitution, and
finally the Phiri case.

3.1 South African Water Law
Water law in South Africa has evolved since the fall of the apartheid government.
The 1996 Constitution contains a right to water in section 27. Water legislation in South
Africa must be considered in light to this right, as well as others included in the
Constitution such as the right to equality, dignity, life, property, and administrative
justice. The new government extensively reviewed water law with an eye for issues of
equity. It initiated a consultative process for developing new guidelines for future water
legislation, and the result was the White Paper on a National Water Policy for South
Africa. This White Paper explained that in 1997 12-14 million South Africans, out of 40
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million, were without access to safe water.82 This was a result of inequitable water
infrastructure that was installed during apartheid. The government’s new water
legislation would be driven by its initial development vision, the Reconstruction and
Development Programme (RDP), issued in 1994. The RDP promised to meet basic
needs, develop human resources, build the economy, and democratize the state.83 Water
was one of the fundamental municipal resources specifically mentioned in the RDP.
Improved access to sufficient, sanitary water was seen as part of the government’s
promise to redress historical injustice exercised against poor black citizens.84
However, the new South African government bowed to pressure from the
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and in 1996 adopted the Growth,
Employment, and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR). GEAR purports to implement the
RDP, but actually fundamentally transitions the national development strategy away from
social welfarism and towards neoliberal principles of development.85 Andrew Magaziner
explains the effect GEAR had on water policy, saying: “GEAR thrust water delivery
responsibility firmly on the shoulders of local municipalities, while the government
simultaneously decreased its social spending and financial support for city council
operations.”86 Magaziner argues that in this situation, cities such as Johannesburg made
the inevitable choice to privatize municipal services and institute cost recovery
mechanisms. Some citizens, including the applicants in the Mazibuko case, saw this as a
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betrayal of the promises made under the RDP. The first post-apartheid water minister,
Kader Asmal, stated: “The RDP makes no reference to free water to the citizens of South
Africa. The provision of such free water has financial implications for local government
that I as a national minister must be extremely careful enforcing on the local
government.”87 Indeed, his first policy mandated the supply of water to consumers at the
marginal cost – the price equivalent to the cost of operating and maintenance costs for an
additional unit of water. John Roome offered him the advice that private management
contracts would be more difficult to establish and maintain if consumers had an
expectation of receiving free water. John Roome is also the World Bank’s task manager
for the Lesotho Highlands Water Project.88 It was in this political climate that new water
legislation was drafted in South Africa.

3.1.1 National Water Act 36 of 1998
The National Water Act (NWA) of 1998 transformed South Africa’s laws
governing water resources. The NWA was a comprehensive reform, abolishing private
ownership of water, placing all water resources in a public trust, and establishing a
compulsory licensing system that promised to facilitate equitable distribution of the
country’s water resources. However, it also adopts or facilitates a number of neoliberal
policies, including decentralizing water resource management to municipalities,
privatization, and full cost recovery. Rose Francis argues that in this way the NWA
blocks the government’s objective of universal access to clean water.89 The NWA
decentralized the management of water resources by establishing parastatal catchment
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agencies to manage water on the level of broad watersheds.90 Each municipality then
either manages its own water services infrastructure or issues a contract to a private firm
to manage water services. The water catchment agency for Johannesburg is Rand
Water,91 and the water management body in Johannesburg is Johannesburg Water.
A portion of the NWA that is relevant to the Mazibuko case is section 59(4),
which provides that a person must be given the opportunity to make representations, or
explain to the water services agency why they should not have their water cut off, within
a reasonable period before any restriction or shut-off of water services is imposed.92 The
residents of Phiri contend that they were not able to make representations before their
water was restricted or shut off by Johannesburg Water. The Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) includes a similar provision in section 3,
stating that administrative decisions must be procedurally fair. This definition of fair
includes adequate notice to citizens, and the opportunity for citizens to make
representations.93

3.1.2 Water Services Act 108 of 1997
The NWA operates along with the Water Services Act (WSA). The WSA
outlines the establishment, the powers, and the responsibilities of water service agencies
such as Johannesburg water. The WSA secures in Section three the right of everyone to
have access to basic water supply and sanitation, thereby conforming to the
Constitutional right to water, and mandates the construction of sufficient pipes to bring
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piped water within two hundred meters of every dwelling.94 The WSA gives the duty to
water service providers, including private suppliers, to take “reasonable” measures to
realize these rights. The procedures for the limitation or discontinuation of water services
must be fair and equitable, and should not be enacted as punishment for non-payment in
the event that a customer can prove that he or she is unable to pay.95 In the Mazibuko
case, the applicants say that Johannesburg Water did not follow the law of the Water
Services Act when it installed pre-paid water meters and shut off water to whose who
could not pay.

3.1.3 Free Basic Water
The Free Basic Water Policy (FBW), as detailed in August 2002, defines the
amount of free basic water as “25 litres per person per day, which is a level sufficient to
promote healthy living. This amounts to about 6000 litres per household per month for a
household of 8 people.”96 It takes note of the fact that 6000 liters may not be enough to
cover waterborne sanitation needs, and that local authorities have the discretion to either
provide less water where the infrastructure does not exist or more water where it is
needed.97 The policy Regulations Relating to Compulsory National Standards and
Measures to Conserve Water of June 2001 hold the same numbers, and add that the
source must be within 200 meters of the household, with a minimum flow rate of 10 liters
per minute, and be with an effectiveness that no consumer is without water supply for
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more than seven full days.98
The 2003 Strategic Framework for Water Services formally recognized the FBW
Policy, which all local municipal authorities are legally obliged to implement. FBW,
while mandating a lifeline amount of free water, makes clear that any water consumed
above the 6kl per person per day must be paid for, in accordance with the principle of full
cost recovery.99

3.2 Procedural Issues
There are certain procedural issues that go along with Constitutional litigation.
The plantiffs – or “applicants” as they are referred to in South African civil cases - in the
Mazibuko case challenged the installation of prepayment water meters in Phiri on
constitutional grounds. They argued that the plan that included prepayment meters was
unconstitutional under section 27, which concerns the right to water. In this section, I
will discuss the conditions that must be met before a case can be heard under Chapter
Two of the Constitution, the Bill of Rights.

3.2.1 Conditions for Bill of Rights litigation
Section 38 of the Constitution considers standing before a court, and qualifies that
anyone protected under the Bill of Rights and acting in their own interest, acting as a
member of or in the interest of a group, or acting in the public interest may bring a
complaint before a court.100 The applicants in the Mazibuko case have standing before
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the court, as they are citizens of South African acting in their own interest, the interest of
their group, and the public.
There are certain conditions that must be met for Bill of Rights litigation. The
court must initiate compliance with certain procedural guidelines before considering the
substantive claims made in a case. These compliance procedures include determining the
breadth of the specific Bill of Rights provision in question, how it should be interpreted,
and if any Section 36 limitations apply in the case at hand.101
The breadth of Section 27 was considered individually by each court, and to
different outcomes. These considerations are discussed in depth in the second part of this
chapter, wherein I dissect the rulings made by each court. The other standard that must
be explored by the court before addressing substantive issues is whether or not the rights
infringement is allowed under the Constitution. Section 36 of the Constitution is the
“limitations clause”, it establishes the boundaries on generally applicable rights, and
outlines the types of situations in which the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights can be
intruded upon or restricted. The limitation must be justifiable in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, and the specific nature of the right
in question.102 Whether or not the limitations clause is applicable is decided on a caseby-case basis, and each judge that heard the Mazibuko case made their own judgment on
section 39, and each found that it did not apply in this case.103
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3.3 Phiri water case
The Mazibuko case is also known as the Phiri Water Case, as all of the applicants
are residents of Phiri, a neighborhood in Soweto. This section will provide some context
for the Mazibuko case by describing the Phiri neighborhood, and then explaining the
stories of the applicants and their specific complaints against the City and Johannesburg
Water. Then I will review the response by the City to these complaints. After setting the
context to this specific case, I will review the arguments made by the judges in the High
Court, the Supreme Court of Appeals, and the Constitutional Court that go to the larger
debate of enforcement of socio-economic rights in a context of scarce resources and
neoliberal development policies.

3.3.1 Phiri
Phiri is a township in Soweto, in Johannesburg, that is bordered by Mapetla and
Moraka. It was established during the apartheid era as an ethnic enclave for Sotho and
Tswana peoples. Tens of thousands of low cost homes were constructed in its early
development, most of which lacked indoor plumbing or working toilets. Homes were
gradually electrified during the course of the 20th century. Following the end of the
apartheid government in the 1990s, a housing shortage occurred in Phiri, resulting in
some two thousand informal backyard dwellings. Phiri has a population density of over
180 persons per hectare, which is overcrowded even by Soweto standards. Households
rarely have a separate bathroom, and there is generally a high level of water loss through
outside taps and antiquated standpipes.104 Water service delivery came through taps or
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standpipes, and households paid a flat rate based on an assumed consumption level.
Around 10% of households in Soweto paid their water bills in the early 2000’s.105 It was
in this environment that Johannesburg Water, along with the City of Johannesburg,
introduced Operation Gcin’amanzi, a form of market environmentalism, by installing
prepaid water meters to reduce non-payment and increase efficiency in Soweto. The first
area to receive these meters was Phiri.

3.3.2 Complaint by applicants
The applicants in the case of Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg protested the use
of these prepayment water meters on several grounds. In this section I will introduce the
applicants whose stories illustrate the relevant complaints against the prepayment meters,
and the grounds upon which they challenged Operation Gcin’amanzi in the court system.
The basis of the case, as well as the arguments made therein, is more extensive and
detailed than the portions covered in this thesis. The debate over market
environmentalism versus the human right to water is only one of the many issues that this
case addresses. However, only the portions that pertain to the issue at hand in this thesis
will be highlighted.
The first applicant, Lindiwe Mazibuko, was 39 years old at the time of the case.
Sadly, she passed away from an illness not long after the decision of the High Court was
handed down.106 She had 20 people in her household, including 6 boarders, 3 babies, and
6 school-age children. Many of these people, including her aging mother, had health
problems. The total monthly income of the household was R1300, which was not enough
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money to pay all expenses and the water bill beyond the free basic amount allocated to
them. Ms. Mazibuko says that the free water never lasted the entire month, and usually
ran out by the 12th or 15th of each month. Her household was without water for more
than half of every month, and could not always afford to buy more water. After the 6000
liters was finished, it was shut off without any warning. In a household of 20, such as
Ms. Mazibuko’s house, 6000 liters a month makes for only 10 liters per person per day,
which is well below the 25 liter minimum standard required for direct consumption, food
preparation, and personal hygiene. Ms. Mazibuko herself states in her affidavit: “The
amount of 6 kilolitres free water we are supplied with is simply not enough for our entire
household’s basic needs. This is despite the fact that we use water only for our basic
needs. We cannot use less water in our household than what we are using at the
moment.”107 Ms. Mazibuko is affiliated with the Coalition Against Water Privatisation
(CAWP), a community group that is part of the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF). Trevor
Ngwane, a former African National Congress (ANC) councilor and head of the regional
ANC in Soweto, who was dismissed from the ANC because of his critique of
privatization of municipal services, founded the APF at the start of Operation
Gcin’amanzi.108 A research report from CAWP that Mazibuko cites in her affidavit
found that there are an average of 16 people per household in Phiri, twice the number the
government assumes.109 She claims that her quality of life has significantly decreased
since the installment of the pre-paid water meters.
The second applicant is Grace Munyai, a 43 year old unemployed adult woman
who owns a property in Phiri along with her husband, who is employed. Her household
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consists of six people, and she had a niece, Sizile, who died of AIDs in April of 2004.
Her household’s only source of water is a standpipe in the yard that was connected in
November of 2004.110 When the standpipe was installed they were only given the choice
between the pipe and prepaid water meter. Before the pipe was installed they went
without water in their home for six months while the community was protesting the
installment of prepaid water meters. During this time Sizile was very sick, in the
terminal stage of AIDs. The family members had to walk 3 kilometers to collect water
for household use and to wash Sizile’s blankets. Grace Munyai states: “There was no
way to get sufficient water for our most basic needs: caring for Sizile, our personal
hygiene, cleaning the house, drinking and cooking”.111 Even after the pipe was installed,
it is inconvenient for them to have to run into the yard for water, and Johannesburg Water
workers check on them often to make sure that they have not tampered with the
standpipe.
The third applicant is Jennifer Makoatsane, a 35-year-old unemployed woman,
living in Phiri with her 61 year old mother and 7 others. There are a total of 9 people in
her household. They received a prepayment water meter in November of 2004, and the
water did not last through the month. The family had to change their cleaning habits in
order to conserve water, which proved especially challenging given that there was a
newborn baby. In January, her father suffered a stroke, and his foot became infected with
gangrene. They were forced to buy more water after the free amount ran out because her
father’s foot needed to be cared for lest his health deteriorate further. Her father died on
February 14th, 2005, and their whole family came for the funeral, putting further stress on
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the water supply. Makoatsane states, “I feel that my rights to water and human dignity
have been violated”.112
The applicants argued that the pre-payment meters are not a reliable source of
water, as they only provide water for about half of the month. Furthermore, the
installation of pre-paid meters has reduced residents’ access to water, representing a step
backward in the progressive realization of the right to access sufficient water as protected
in the Constitution. The applicants asserted that the National Standards Regulation 3(b),
which legally sets the minimum standard of basic water supply outlined in the Free Basic
Water Policy at 25 liters per person per day or 6 kiloliters per household per month, is
unconstitutional, as it does not meet the standard of access to sufficient water that is
guaranteed in the Constitution. Even if 25 liters per person per day were sufficient, the
clause of 6 kiloliters per household per month violates section 9(3) of the Constitution, as
it incidentally directly or indirectly discriminates against poor black people who live in
large households and cannot pay for water beyond the basic free water allotment.113 All
of these charges cut to the heart of the critiques of market environmentalism. Operation
Gcin’amanzi uses neoliberal development techniques through enforcing payment for
water services, while the applicants argue that this strategy violates their constitutional
and human right to water because they are unable to pay for the service.

3.4 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg
The Mazibuko case was decided in three different courts over the course of two
years. This section aims to pit these three decisions against each other, compare their
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arguments, and gauge the reactions of the South African people through commentary in
the print and online media. The main topics of contention between the three courts are as
follows: the interpretation of section 27 of the Constitution (s27), the role of foreign and
international law in influencing South African courts, the definition of “sufficient” water
and if there is minimum core content to s27, the concept of progressive realization of
socio-economic rights, and the constitutional test of reasonableness. Each of these topics
will be considered in turn, as will their significance to the tension between neoliberal
development strategy and human rights. However, before considering the reasoning
behind the decisions, it is important to know the outcome of each decision.
The High Court of South Africa, Witwatersrand Local Division, was the first
body to hear this case. The hearing was from the 3rd to the 5th of December, 2007, and
the judgment was handed down by Judge M P Tsoka on April 30th, 2008. Judge Tsoka
ordered that the forced installation of the pre-payment water meters in the Phiri Township
by the City of Johannesburg and Johannesburg Water without the choice of only a prepayment meter or a standpipe is unconstitutional and unlawful. He found that the
prepayment system as a whole in Phiri is unconstitutional and unlawful. Judge Tsoka,
through his decision, makes clear that he supports the human rights side of the debate at
hand, and ordered City of Johannesburg and Johannesburg Water114 to provide each of
the applicants and similarly placed residents of Phiri with 50 liters per person per day of
free basic water, and the option of a metered supply of water to be installed at the cost of
the City.
The order of the Supreme Court of Appeals was technically a victory for the
Mazibuko team. However, once the text is further inspected, it is possible to glean the
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ground gained by the City in this appeal. The order as written by Judge Streicher is as
follows:
The appeal is upheld and the order by the court below [the High Court] is
replaced with the following order:
1. The decision of the first respondent and/or the second respondent to
limit the free basic water supply to the residents of Phiri to 25 liters per
person per day or 6kl per household per month is reviewed and set aside.
2. It is declared:
(a) That 42 liters water per Phiri resident per day would constitute
sufficient water in terms of s 27 (1) of the Constitution.
(b) That the first respondent is, to the extent that it is in terms of s 27(1) of
the Constitution reasonable to do so, having regard to its available
resources and other relevant considerations, obliged to provide 42 liters
free water to each Phiri resident who cannot afford to pay for such water.
3. The first and second respondents are ordered to reconsider and
reformulate their free water policy in the light of the preceding paragraphs
of this order.
4. Pending the reformulation of their free water policy the first and second
respondents are ordered to provide each account holder in Phiri who is
registered as an indigent with 42 liters pf free water per day per member of
his or her household.
5. It is declared that the prepayment water meters used in Phiri Township
in respect to water service level 3 consumers are unlawful.
6. The order in paragraph 5 is suspended for a period of two years in order
to enable the first respondent to legalise the use of prepayment meters in
so far as it may be made possible to do so.115
While Judge A. Streicher, seems to have followed the ruling of Judge Tsoka, he
deviates from the harder precedent set by the High Court in two important respects. First,
he lowers the amount of water considered to be the minimum core amount that the City
should provide free of charge from 50 liters to 42 liters per person per day. Second, he
gives the City leeway in saying that it should reconsider its water policy in light of its
available resources and by suspending the removal of prepaid water meters for two years
so that the City can amend its bylaws to make the meters legal. By ordering the City to
provide a high amount of water for free, Judge Streicher is supporting the argument that
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there is a right to water. However, he also allows the City to legalize prepayment meters,
signaling that he also supports the privatization of water services.
Justice Kate O’Regan wrote the Constitutional Court’s decision. The case was
heard on September 2nd, 2009, and the decision was given on October 8th of the same
year. Justice O’Regan set aside the orders of the two lower courts. She found the Free
Basic Water policy to be fair, and the system of prepayment meters to be constitutional.
Her decision supports the market environmentalism and neoliberal development policies
of the state on the surface, but has an underlying argument for the right to water. She
makes the case that the City is making progress towards the realization of the right to
water through the use of prepayment meters. Given scarce resources and the expense of
delivering water services, the court does not have the power to challenge the City’s plan
so long as it is working towards fulfilling its obligations under Section 27 of the
Constitution.
Now, with the three decisions in mind, I will turn to the reasoning behind these
orders, and explore how each court interpreted the major issues in this case. Through this
analysis, it is possible to see the right to water disappear as the courts attempt to reconcile
it with the existing development strategies of the South African government.

47

3.4.1 Interpretation of Section 27 of the Constitution
The constitutional basis of this case is section 27, parts 1 and 2, of the
Constitution. This section states:
27. Health care, food, water and social security
1. Everyone has the right to have access to 1. --2. sufficient food and water; and
3. --2. The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within
its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of
these rights.116
The three courts had different interpretations of s27. Judge Tsoka of the High
Court only briefly addresses his interpretation of this section of the Bill of Rights. He
views section 27 through the lens of section 39(1)(b), which states that a Court
interpreting the Bill of Rights must consider international law, and in terms of section
233, which provides that a interpretation of legislation consistent with international law
must be preferred.117 His conclusion is that “…the State is obliged to provide free basic
water to the poor”118 under s27 (1), and under s27(2) the respondents are obliged to
provide more than the minimum amount of water if the residents need more water, and if
the City is able to provide more water within its available resources. The amount of
water that Judge Tsoka found “sufficient”119 was 50 liters per person per day, he ordered
the City to provide this amount to citizens for free.
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The implication of this order for the City was sizeable, considering that at the
time of the ruling they were providing free water at only 6kl per household per month.
The City contended that free water is not fiscally or environmentally sustainable, and that
they are under pressure to collect payments since they do not get the water for free from
their suppliers.120 This argument reflects the pressure of neoliberal economic
development on government facing scarce resources with high demand. Not only does
the City see the practice of providing free water as environmentally unsustainable given
the arid climate where Johannesburg is located, they are also under an obligation to profit
from the water industry. This tension makes the fulfillment of the socio-economic right
to water, as ordered by Judge Tsoka and based in his use of international law, logistically
difficult.
Judge Moroa Tsoka’s ruling sparked a debate in the South African media. On one
side, the supporters of the applicants hailed his decision as a landmark case, the first case
in which the courts ruled on the side of the poor and disadvantaged, setting a precedent
for juridical enforcement of socio-economic rights in South African jurisprudence and
worldwide.121 The other side, including Johannesburg mayor Amos Masondo, criticized
Judge Tsoka for making policy, and overstepping the boundaries of the power of the
courts.122 While supporters in the media hailed Judge Tsoka’s approach of setting a hard
line for the enforcement of rights, ultimately the arguments in favor of neoliberal
development and market environmentalism proved stronger in the minds of Judges
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Streicher and O’Regan, and the other two courts took a less hard-line interpretation of
Section 27.
Judge Streicher of the Supreme Court of Appeals addressed the interpretation of
s27 with a method used by the Constitutional Court in Soobramoney v. Minister of Health
(KwaZulu-Natal). In that decision, Chief Justice Chaskalson wrote:
“…the obligations imposed on the state by sections 26 and 27 in
regard to access to housing, health case, food, water, and social
security are dependent upon the resources available for such
purposes, and that the corresponding rights themselves are limited
by reason of the lack of resources. Given this lack of resources
and the significant demands on them…an unqualified obligation to
meet these needs would not presently be capable of being
fulfilled.”123
In other words, according to Section 27, everyone may have the right to access to
sufficient water, but everyone does not have a claim to immediate fulfillment of that right
if the resources are not available to the government to provide the infrastructure and
services that the right requires. Citizens’ ability to claim their rights under Section 27 is
subject to the availability of resources. This interpretation is a reflection of the logic of
neoliberal development and limited resources, in this case the limited amount of water
and money to build water infrastructure. If the City cannot pay to provide this water and
water delivery infrastructure to the citizens for free, then it is not under obligation to do
so. The responsibility of securing access to water falls to the consumers, who must be
able to pay for the water in order to access an amount beyond the six kiloliters per
household her month mandated by the FBW policy. Their right to access water is
constrained by their ability to pay for the service. This is a departure from Judge Tsoka’s
claim that everyone has right to immediate fulfillment of the right to water, expressed
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through the order on the City to provide “sufficient” water in the amount of fifty liters per
person per day for free.
The Constitutional Court’s interpretation of Section 27 largely agrees with that of
the Supreme Court of Appeals, though is expressed much more clearly. Justice O’Regan
writes that Section 27(1) of the Constitution creates a right to access sufficient water.
The creation of this right imposes certain obligations on the state. Justice O’Regan then
investigates what kind of obligations are imposed on the state in her discussion of the
relationship between Section 27 (1) (b) and Section 27(2), which reads “The state must
take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve
the progressive realization of each of these rights”124 She says that the state’s role in the
protection of human rights is traditionally to uphold negative rights, otherwise known as
non-interference. However, in this case the question is to what extent the state can be
held to a positive obligation to fulfill the right to water. To answer this question, Justice
O’Regan turns to two previous decisions, Grootboom125 and Treatment Action Campaign
No. 2,126 to illustrate how the Constitutional Court has dealt with questions of obligations
imposed on the state by positive human rights in the past. Basing her opinion on these
earlier decisions, Justice O’Regan asserts that it is clear that the right does not require the
state to provide every person with sufficient water upon demand, but rather requires the
state to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within available resources, in
order to work towards the progressive realization of the right to water. As long as the
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state is taking steps towards fulfilling the right, it is considered to be fulfilling its
constitutional obligation. Therefore, citizens cannot appeal to the Constitution for
immediate fulfillment of the right to water. Given that governments face limited
resources, the immediate fulfillment of this right is impossible, and the Court cannot
place impossible demands on the City. The City does not have the resources to provide
water beyond FBW amount, because it cannot afford to do so. It cannot afford to provide
this water, because it is operating under a development strategy that requires it to recover
the full cost of the service that it provides. Again, the logic of neoliberal development
overcomes the arguments for a human right to water in the court’s interpretation of
Section 27.

3.4.2 Role of Foreign & International law
An important and unique part of the South African Constitution is Section 39,
which instructs courts in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights. This section states:
39. When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum 1. must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on
human dignity, equality and freedom;
2. must consider international law; and
3. may consider foreign law.127
Section 39 of the Constitution is important to the larger theme of this paper, the
intersection of development and human rights in developing countries. As was seen in
Chapter Three, a right to water can be constructed in international law. If the courts
choose to rely heavily on international law in their decisions, then we could expect to see
a consensus that there is an immediate right to water. However, if the courts did not rely
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heavily on international law and instead based their decisions on domestic law and the
constraints of resource availability, we would see a consensus that there is not an
immediate right to water. All three courts had unique interpretations of their duties under
Section 39, with significant effects on the outcomes of their rulings.
The High Court interpreted Section 39 differently than the other two courts, as
Judge Tsoka was the only authority to rely upon foreign law to support his reasoning. He
relies on case law from lower courts in Brazil and Argentina to illustrate the unlawfulness
of that discontinuation of water supply to indigent people due to non-payment. The
highest court in the State of Parana in Brazil found in 2002 that “the disconnection of
needed water supply constitutes a violation of human rights – even if it is the result of a
non-payment”.128 In the matter of Users and Consumers in Defence v Aguas del Gran
Buenos Aires in 2002 an unspecified Argentine court found that the water company is not
entitled to interrupt service and supply of water, as access to fresh water is a human right
which all inhabitants of a country must be granted, regardless of ability to pay. The Civil
and Commercial First Instance Court of Cordoba, Argentina, found again in 2002 in
Quevedo Miguel Angel y ortos cl Aquas Cordobesas SA Amparo, Cordoba City, Juez
Sustituta de Primera Instancia 51 Nominacion en 10 Civil y Comercial de la Gudad de
Corboda that the disconnection of water supply to low-income and indigent residents
because they could not pay was unlawful. These decisions support the human rights
approach to water delivery services, as they condemn the logic that access to water
should be limited by access to the market, or the ability to pay.
Judge Tsoka made use of international law in his investigation of the existence of
the international right to access to fresh water. He justified his use of international law in
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this case through two previous cases in South Africa, Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v
Southern Metropolitan Local Concil 2006 (6) BCLR 625 (W) and The Government of the
Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC).
Both of these cases stress the importance of international law when interpreting the Bill
of Rights, including both binding and non-binding international law. On this basis, he
turns to several sources of international law to support the right to water. First, Judge
Tsoka looked to the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), and argued that Article 11 and 12 implicitly recognize the right to water
through the rights to an adequate standard of living and the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health. United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights General Comment No. 15 of 2002 emphasizes the right to accessibility
and availability of fresh water. Accessibility means that water should be both physically
and economically accessible to all people regardless of economic status, while
availability means that water supply must be sufficient for each person for personal and
domestic use as well as continuous. Judge Tsoka writes: “The effect is that the right to
water must be accessible equally to the rich as well as to the poor and to the most
vulnerable members of the populations. It is in this context that the State is under an
obligation to provide the poor with the necessary water and water facilities on a nondiscriminatory basis.”129 He takes a logical leap with the use of the word “obligation” to
describe the responsibilities of the state to the poor, and does not provide a basis for this
conclusion.
Judge Tsoka highlights in his decision that General Comment 15 explicitly states
that the State has a constant and continuing duty to work towards the progressive
129
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realization of the right to water. While the term “progressive realization” is somewhat
intentionally vague, the Committee also says that retrogressive measures are prohibited,
so the State cannot do anything that would reduce existing accessibility or availability of
water. The applicants argued that the prepayment meters greatly reduced the availability
and accessibility of water in Phiri. The Convention of the Rights (CRC) of the Child and
its African equivalent (ACRC) specifically state in Article 24 of the CRC and Article 14
of the ACRC that the State has an obligation to fully implement the right of children to
the highest possible standard of health and to combat disease through the provision of
adequate food and drinking water. The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights
guarantees in Article 16 the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health. The African Commission on Human Rights found that failure by the State
to supply basic services, such as water, is a violation of this right. Judge Tsoka finds that
it is clear from this international law, along with the South African Bill of Rights, that the
State is obligated to provide free basic water to the poor. This conclusion is another
logical leap for which he provides no basis; however it does show Judge Tsoka’s support
to the human right to water regardless of the existence of scarce environmental or
financial resources.
Judge Streicher of the Supreme Court of Appeals made use of international law
for a more limited purpose than did Judge Tsoka. He employed international law to
answer the question of whether or not the City must provide access to sufficient water for
free.130 In his written decision, he first turns to General Comment 15, as did Judge
Tsoka. He points out that this General Comment says that water, along with water
facilities and services, must be affordable and accessible for all, including the most
130
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vulnerable or marginalized sections of the population. This must be true in law and in
fact. He dismisses the City’s assertion that it does not have to provide free water under
the Water Services Act, which expressly states that a person who has demonstrated that
they cannot pay for water must not be denied water service because of non-payment. He
says that the City has realized that it holds the responsibility to provide free water, as
evidenced by its, as of the time of the case, unimplemented Free Basic Water
Implementation Strategy Document. This document recommends 10kl free water per
household per month be provided to households based on land valued below a certain
amount, and that no free water be given to households valued above that amount. This
policy was to be implemented in July of 2008. While the whole strategy has not been
adopted, the City adopted interim measures in 2007 that include using the indigents list to
determine which households are eligible to receive 10kl of free water per month. The
City argued to the court that it has limited resources and must recover the full cost of its
services. High-income users already heavily subsidize water use by lower income users,
and the City cannot afford to give more free water than the basic amount to those who
cannot pay for the service. There are other demands on the City’s resources, such as the
many more households without any basic access to water. Judge Streicher finds that the
current free water policy was adopted because the City made an error when it assumed
that the Water Services Act superseded Section 27(1) of the Constitution, and thought
that while they were obligated to provide 25 liters per person per day or 6kl per
household per month, it was not for free. Therefore, having found that the City must
provide sufficient free water under international law and domestic law, Judge Streicher
decided to set aside the free water policy of the City on the grounds that a right to access
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sufficient water exists, and the City has demonstrated that it has the ability to grant this
access. This decision straddles the two extremes in the debate over the nature of water.
On one side, Judge Streicher finds that there is a right to water, and that the City must
provide sufficient water free of charge. However, he finds that it must provide free water
only based on the conclusion that the City can afford to provide this service because it is
within its available resources.

This condition supports the idea that water must be paid

for by someone, and idea that is unavoidable in a market economy.
Justice O’Regan of the Constitutional Court does not rely on international or
foreign law when considering the constitutionality of the Free Basic Water policy and the
use of prepayment meters. She mentions it only once, when considering the concept of
progressive realization, and how it relates to the existence or non-existence of a minimum
core content to Section 27. The concept of “minimum core” originates in international
law, in General Comment 3 (1990) of the United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights.
The use of foreign and international law decreased as the case moved up the
hierarchy of the courts. As the use of foreign and international law substantively
decreased, so did the benefits of the decision for the applicants. From this pattern it is
possible to conclude that an enforceable right to water begins to disappear as the court
moves away from the international level, i.e. human rights documents, and grounds its
decisions more in domestic law and policy. The next step is to investigate why this
happens, and this will be addressed in the next sections, which address the existence or
non-existence of a minimum core content to s27, the legality of prepayment meters, and
the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of progressive realization.
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3.4.3 “Sufficient” water and minimum core
Section 27 of the Constitution states that everyone has a right to sufficient water.
In this case, the applicants claimed that the state was not fulfilling that right, since 6kl of
water per household per month is not sufficient. Therefore, it fell to the courts in this
case to weigh evidence presented to them in order to determine an amount of water that is
“sufficient”. This exercise was designed to give a core content to the right, and was
followed by the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeals. The Constitutional
Court, however, rejected the idea of a minimum core content to the right to water, as it
had with other socio-economic rights in previous decisions.
Judge Tsoka of the High Court referenced the World Health Organization (WHO)
guidelines in order to determine what is meant by sufficient water. The WHO guidelines
provide 25 liters per person per day as the basic amount of water required to maintain life
over the short term. These 25 liters per person per day for purposes of consumption, and
does not assure hygiene. The Free Basic Water Policy in South Africa states that the
minimum quantity of potable water provided should be 25 liters per person per day.
“Minimum” means that cities are free to provide more at their discretion, and some
places such as Volksrust in KwaZulu-Natal do provide more than the minimum amount
to their residents. Given that water is a scarce resource, and that South Africa must
import water from other countries such as Lesotho, Judge Tsoka finds it understandable
that the minimum amount provided for in the Free Basic Water Policy be 25 liters per
person per day.
Judge Toska found that under Section 27(2) of the Constitution the respondents
are obliged to provide more than the minimum amount of water if the residents needs
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demand it, and if they have the available resources to provide more water. He found that
the residents do have a need for more than the six kiloliters per household per month that
the City provides them. Many households contain more than eight people, the number of
people used to calculate the allowance, and many households have heightened sanitation
needs due to illness. These two circumstances require more than six kiloliters per
household per month of free basic water. Judge Tsoka ordered that each resident be
giving fifty liters of water per person per day.
To support this decision, he relies on the affidavits of an expert that was presented
to the court by the applicants, Peter Henry Gleick, the President of the Institute for
Studies in Development, Environment, and Security. Gleick argues that, based on his
substantial international comparative research, the Basic Water Requirement (BWR) for
human needs is 50 liters per person per day. These 50 liters encompass cleaning,
hygiene, drinking, cooking, and basic sanitation. Gleick goes on to state that the
residents of Phiri need this much water every day due to their specific situation. They
live in a hot, dry climate, and therefore require drinking water. Phiri is a crowded urban
environment where the residents need to maintain sanitation, and cannot rely on rivers for
bathing. Food needs to be washed and cooked in order to assure healthy eating. Six
kiloliters per household per month is not enough to provide 25 liters per person per day in
a place where the average household size is 16, and is certainly not enough to provide 50
liters per person per day.
Judge Tsoka finds that waterborne sanitation is essential to life in Phiri, and for
the respondents to expect the applicants to conserve water through the use of prepayment
meters to the detriment of their health is to deny them the right to lead a healthy and
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dignified life. In this context, twenty-five liters per person per day of free water is
insufficient. The city has the financial capacity to increase the amount of water provided
to the applicants. The policies that have been adopted by the respondents to partially
relieve water shortages while still imposing prepayment meters show that they also have
the resources to provide more than 25 liters per person per day. Judge Tsoka reasons that
the respondents can provide 50 liters per person per day without straining their capacity
to provide water or their financial resources. He does not give a basis for this reasoning.
Jackie Dugard, a senior researcher and director of the Centre for Applied Legal
Studies at the University of Witswatersrand, and a member of the applicants’ legal team
expressed the importance of Judge Tsoka’s ruling in an interview with the Inter Press
Service. Dugard described how South Africa has a constitution that is very strong on
socio-economic rights, however the Constitutional Court has chosen to adopt a test of
reasonableness rather than a minimum core standard.131 They look at whether or not the
government policy that provides the context for the rights is reasonable. Judge Tsoka
went beyond the reasonableness test and investigated if the minimum core of the right to
water was being respected in this case. He relied heavily on international law in order to
determine the content of the right to water to provide the state with a meaningful standard
by which to judge reasonableness. Judge Tsoka stated in his decision that the
Constitutional Court had not rejected the concept of the minimum core; it had just not
seen fit to use it in the two socio-economic cases that it had heard,132 as the minimum
core in those cases was too difficult to determine due to the nature of the rights in
question. However, in the case of water rights, “without providing a basic content to the
131
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right to have sufficient water, the right remains devoid of content”.133
The City of Johannesburg argued that it had fulfilled its duty to the progressive
realization of the applicants’ right to water through the prepaid water meter system, since
the applicants were paying less than under the meter system and receiving free water for
the first time. In its view, market environmentalism was working in Phiri by delivering
an economically efficient amount of water. The residents are better off now, according to
the City, especially after the amount of free water was increased to ten kiloliters per
person per day for registered indigents and people with HIV/AIDS.134
The legal team for the Phiri applicants, along with the Anti-Privatisation Forum
and the Coalition Against Water Privatization, were optimistic that the High Court’s
hard-line human rights based ruling concerning the core content of the right to water
would be respected in the Supreme Court of Appeals. Jackie Dugard released a statement
saying, “Judge Tsoka showed that socio-economic rights have teeth. His judgment shows
a careful and sensitive understanding of the law, the City’s obligations, but above all our
client’s lives”.135
Judge Streicher of the Supreme Court of Appeals did indeed find that there is a
core content to the right to water. He reasoned that, since the heart of the Constitution is
a commitment to equality and human dignity, it follows that the right to access sufficient
water is a right to access the amount of water that is necessary for a person to live a
dignified life. He finds support for this conclusion in General Comment 15, specifically
133
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the portion which discusses the necessity of water for the realization of other rights, and
that the amount of water must be adequate for human dignity. The amount of water
which is considered to be adequate relies on the circumstances in which the person or
people in question are living. Judge Streicher goes on to analyze how much water is
needed to live a dignified life in Phiri. He looks to the Water Services Act minimum
amount of twenty-five liters per person per day, or six kiloliters per household per month,
and concludes that this minimum must have been set in terms of communities that do
have waterborne sanitation, since the evidence suggests that a flush toilet dispenses of
approximately 10 liters of water with each flush. Phiri does have waterborne sanitation,
and nobody had suggested that twenty-five liters per person per day is enough water to
lead a dignified life in Phiri, nor could anyone suggest this given the evidence provided.
Judge Streicher questions the claims of the applicant’s expert witness, Peter
Gleick, concerning the core content to the right to water, and weighs them against the
assertions of the expert witness called by the City, I.H. Palmer. Palmer is a civil engineer
and the managing director of a consultancy company that offers expertise on water
supply and sanitation. He takes a different view on how much water is required for a
dignified life in a Highveld climate, such as the one in which Phiri is situated, concluding
that 41.2 liters per day would be sufficient. Judge Streicher sees no reason offered by
either party as to why Gleick’s testimony should be given more weigh than Palmer’s, and
concludes that forty-two liters of water per person per day would constitute sufficient
water in terms of Section 27(1) of the Constitution.
Justice O’Regan of the Constitutional Court also addresses the claim of the
applicants that the Court should give content to the right to water by setting a minimum
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amount that is considered to fill the definition of “sufficient”. Historically, the South
African Constitutional Court has rejected the concept of a minimum core. In Grootboom
the Court rejected this notion, citing concerns of the Court’s ability to determine a
minimum core that would facilitate the progressive realization of the right without all of
the information about what the deliverance of the right entails. Justice O’Regan also
cites Treatment Action Campaign, in which the Court explained that it is not in the
position to issue orders that could have multiple unforeseen social and economic
consequences. The role of the Court is to hold the state to its constitutional obligations
and determine the reasonableness of its actions, not to make decisions that have
budgetary implications. Decisions that would affect the budget should be left to the
legislature, where the democratic process can take place. In other words, the Court does
not find it appropriate to interfere with the development strategy that has been
implemented by the government.
This is the point where we see the ability to enforce socio-economic rights vanish.
The Constitutional Court stands by the assertion that the legislature and the executive
should be the primary places for socio-economic rights to be realized, and the Court does
not want to interfere with this process by setting a minimum standard. They do not insert
a rights-based approach to development into the market-based strategy that is used by the
government. The right to water, as understood in international law, vanishes when the
Court does not intervene in the market-based system of development that grants access to
resources based on the ability to pay.
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3.4.4 Progressive realization and standard of reasonableness
The idea of progressive realization supports neoliberal development strategies
through giving states some leeway in the enforcement of rights. The text of Section 27
(2), which states that the state must take steps towards the progressive realization of the
right to water, implies that the right cannot be fulfilled immediately. Justice O’Regan
argues that this means the people cannot demand immediate fulfillment of the right to
water. The Constitution and the Courts are in place to hold the state accountable for the
manner in which they seek to pursue these rights, to make sure that they are working
towards the realization of socio-economic rights. Progressive realization gives the
government an obligation to continually review its policies in order to work towards the
achievement of the right for all people, but frees it from the obligation to grant the right
immediately. The fact that the City has, within the period of litigation, reviewed its
social services policy and amended it in an effort to bring basic water to more people is
evidence that the City is working towards the progressive realization of the right to water.
The Constitutional Court has rejected the idea of a minimum core content to
socio-economic rights, and instead employs a test of “reasonableness” of the policies
used to implement these rights. Justice O’Regan considers the reasonableness of the
City’s Free Basic Water policy as it was in 2007 when the High Court rendered its
judgment. Recognizing that the policy has since changed, she explains the three levels of
service that are offered to consumers: Service Level 1, which provides for communal taps
that consumers do not pay for, Service Level 2, which provides for yard standpipes for
which consumers pay a fixed fee, and Service Level 3, which provides for metered
connections and consumers pay according to their usage. Every consumer in the City
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receives six kiloliters of water for free every month, and beyond that must pay for their
consumption. The tariff system for water is a rising-block system, so every unit of water
is more expensive than the last unit. Water is priced at the marginal cost of producing the
next unit, a strategy employed in the logic of market environmentalism. As water gets
more expensive, the cost will deter waste. The effect of this tariff system is that heavy
water users cross subsidize those that use less water, normally poor households. Poor
households that have an income of less than twice the highest government grant plus R1
are able to register for the City’s indigent registry. Once on the registry, they must accept
the installation of prepayment meters for water and electricity, and they receive ten free
kiloliters of water per person per household.
The applicants argued that the City’s Free Basic Water policy is unreasonable
because it provides free water to everyone regardless of income, it is formulated per
household instead of per person, it is based on the misconception that they were under no
obligation to provide free water, and the amount of water allocated is insufficient for
large households. Justice O’Regan takes each of these arguments in turn. She found that
the policy of providing all households with free water to be reasonable on the grounds
that households that use more water are charged for their heavier water use, and it is
difficult to establish a method to target households that are more deserving of free water
than others. Justice O’Regan found the City’s policy of allocating water per household
rather than per person to be reasonable because, given the number of informal settlements
and the continual movement of people within the city, it is too administratively difficult
to determine how many people occupy each household. The applicants also argued that
the policy was based on the City’s misunderstanding that is was not under an obligation
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to provide a specific amount of water for free. However, given Justice O’Regan’s
conclusion that the City is not obligated to provide a minimum core amount of water for
free, but simply to work towards the progressive realization of the right to water, she
concluded that the policy is not inconsistent with the Constitution or unreasonable.
Justice O’Regan found the FBW Policy to be reasonable despite the fact that the amount
allocated may be insufficient for large households. The fact that the amount of free basic
water may be insufficient is an unavoidable result of establishing a universal allocation.
It is difficult to determine where large households are, as often they are located in
informal settlements such as Phiri. However, raising the basic level of services to
accommodate these large households would be expensive and inequitable, since it will
still disproportionately benefit residents with smaller households.
An article in Business Day by Eusebius McKaiser celebrates the tight legal
arguments made by Justice O’Regan in her decision. He examines the court’s
reasonableness test for the enforcement of socio-economic right in government policy,
saying, “This requires a delicate balancing act. The court should not dictate the content of
socioeconomic policies. That is the government’s prerogative, and it is desirable because
the government has a popular mandate for policy creation, while the courts do not.”136
The Court did not attempt to establish a minimum core to the right to water, instead
investigating whether or not the government had demonstrated that it is working towards
the progressive realization of the right to water. McKaiser discusses how this case
illustrates the importance of the Constitutional Court not overstepping its boundaries, and
believes that the reasonableness test is a powerful tool for accountability to the rights
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guaranteed in the Constitution, while maintaining the market-based development policies.
Jackie Dugard responded to McKaiser’s article, saying she believes that the
litigation was strategic and successful, even though the Court did not rule in their favor.
It was successful because it raised the profile of issues surrounding water privatization
and the right to water. The loss itself can be used strategically to show the gap between
constitutional ideals and the real conditions of poverty, and perhaps to push the
legislature towards adopting legislation to bridge these gaps and end inequalities.137
Not all members of the Phiri team were so gracious in their defeat. The Coalition
Against Water Privatization wrote a post on the Western Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign’s
blog accusing Justice O’Regan of lazy legalism and bias. The post mentions that the
decision was unanimous among the Constitutional Court justices, but does not allow this
to be an excuse for what they believe to be a clear mistake on the part of the judges. The
CAWP’s major complaint, beyond the fact that the Court seemed to take the City and
Johannesburg Water at their word about the success of the programs, is that the judges
accept that the City has a duty to work towards sufficient water for all people, however
they refuse to set a minimum core quantity as a goal. They argue that there is “no
foundational of time/spatial basis upon which to adjudge what constitutes ‘progressive
realization.’”138
This is a problem inherent in the idea of progressive realization that is at the heart
of the debate over the nature of water. However the reasonableness test may be the best
option for the present, given that South Africa was not left with many economic
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resources after the end of apartheid. The CAWP as well as legal experts were
disappointed that the Constitutional Court did not engage the content of the right to water
by establishing a minimum core, arguing that progressive realization is meaningless
without a normative goal to aspire to.139 The Court’s ruling does limit the ability of
people to hold the state accountable to a goal, but it does assert the fact that the state must
continue to make changes and work towards fulfilling the right to water. In essence, the
Constitutional Court’s decision supports the argument that a right to water exists
theoretically, but cannot be enforced in the face of market-based development strategies
and limited resources.
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Chapter Four: Implications of Mazibuko for Right to Water
The larger tensions between neoliberal development schemes and the idea of the
right to water came together in the Mazibuko case. All three courts had to weigh
concerns of individual rights, sustainability, and economic development while deciding
how to proceed in this application. This case was the first right to water case to be heard
in the highest court of a state, and South Africa has taken a role as a leader in national
enforcement of socio-economic rights.140 Therefore, the approach that the Constitutional
Court took to the case sets an important precedent for the feasibility of judicial
enforcement of the right to water. This judgment, as well as the larger trends in the
Constitutional Court’s history of socio-economic rights cases, must be investigated in
order to distill lessons that could affect the enforcement of the right to water in other
developing countries.
The main question is: Can the right to water be enforced on a national level? In
order to answer this question, it is necessary to discuss two topics. First, I will discuss
the justiciability of socio-economic rights in South Africa, and how the Mazibuko case
reinforced previous decisions by the Constitutional Court. Then, I will review how the
implications of the Mazibuko judgment and the Constitutional Court’s approach to socioeconomic rights affect the enforceability of the right to water through the judicial system.
I will conclude that, while the right to water can be constructed on an international level,
national enforcement is not currently feasible. Finally, I will offer some of my own
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thoughts concerning how activists for the right to water in South Africa, as well as the
nation of South Africa, can move forward towards realizing the right to water.

4.1 Justiciability of socio-economic rights
The justiciability of socio-economic rights is an emerging subject. Civil and
political rights are generally negative rights, the right to be free from state interference.
These are generally considered to be justiciable, as they require the court to order the
state to stop an action. Socio-economic rights, however, are generally positive rights that
require supplemental state action. Enforcement of these rights would require courts to
order the state to do something, such as supply all citizens with sufficient water. The
1996 Constitution contains a Bill of Rights that includes civil and political rights as well
as socio-economic rights, and was envisioned to be fully justiciable.141 Since the
adoption of the Bill of Rights, the ability of the Constitutional Court to enforce socioeconomic rights has been tested in several cases that include the Mazibuko judgment.
The Mazibuko case served as a test for the Court to either solidify the approach that it has
taken in previous socio-economic rights cases, or to diverge from their trend and take a
different approach. The two possible approaches that the Court could have taken were
the “reasonableness” test that was developed with the case of Soobramoney v Minister of
Health, or to adopt a “minimum core” approach, which would have given solid content to
the right to water. First, I will explain the origin of “minimum core”, and why the
Constitutional Court has rejected this notion in its previous cases and in this case. Then, I
will explain the development of the “reasonableness” test and how it was applied in the
Mazibuko case.
141
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4.1.1 Minimum core
The United Nations Committee on Economic and Social Rights developed the
concept of minimum core content to a socio-economic right in 1990, equating it to a legal
entitlement and an obligation of strict liability that the state has to its citizens.142 In the
Committee’s General Comment no.3, they reflect upon the language contained in Article
2.1, which encourages states to “to take steps, individually and through international
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly
the adoption of legislative measures.”143 The right to water in section 27 of the South
African Constitution contains the same language in s27 (2), providing that the state must
take “reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve
the progressive realization”144 of the right to water. The idea of progressive realization
could be interpreted to give states an excuse for not implementing the rights in the
Covenant, and for cities to not enforce the right to water. In order to prevent this
shortcoming, the Committee developed the idea of a minimum core content to each
socio-economic right. Without a minimum core, the Committee is of the opinion that the
Covenant would lose its reason for being, as there would be no content to the rights
contained within. A minimum core would also establish a way to measure the progress
of the states party to the agreement, and assure that the citizens of those states would
have their rights fulfilled. The core content would function as the floor below which no
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state can fall, and “In order for a State party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at
least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate
that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort
to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.”145 In the case of the right
to water, having a minimum core content would make the right to water more easily
enforced by the judiciary. It would give the court a standard by which to measure the
actions of the state, and it could judge whether or not the state had met the standard.
The High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeals both adopted the minimum
core standard in their judgments, while the Constitutional Court rejected it. The
reasoning behind the Court’s rejection of the minimum core standard lies in previous
cases heard since the 1996 Constitution came into effect. The central concern of the
Court has been the availability of state resources. This concern was first voiced in
Soobramoney v Minister of Health, a case that brought the right to healthcare to the
Constitutional Court. The Court ruled that the applicant, Mr. Soobramoney, was not
entitled to weekly dialysis under s27,146 as ruling in his favor would have mistakenly
prioritized terminal illnesses over preventing threatening medical conditions and
therefore limited the state’s ability to fund preventative healthcare programs. This
decision showed extreme deference, signaling an early indication of its continued
hesitation to assert a judicial voice in traditionally legislative or administrative matters.147
The Court outright rejected the minimum core standard in Minister of Health and Others
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v Treatment Action Campaign and Others in 2002, asserting that “it is impossible to give
everyone access even to a ‘core’ service immediately. All that is possible, and all that
can be expected from the state, is that it act reasonably to provide access to the socioeconomic rights identified in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive basis.”148
The practice of not interfering with other branches of the state that began with
Soobramoney developed into a rejection of the minimum core content of a right, as
asserting a minimum core could have policy and budgetary repercussions. The
implication of a rejection of minimum core for the right to water is that there is no
quantity that can be asserted as the minimum amount of water that the state must supply
in order to comply with the Constitution. Citizen’s ability to seek immediate relief under
the Constitution is therefore significantly limited.
The Court rejected the minimum core in the Mazibuko case because they believed
that asserting a minimum core content to the right to water would have budgetary
implications. The Constitutional Court maintained that it is not their place to make
decisions that are best left to the executive and legislature, where the democratic process
should take place. Justice O’Regan writes: “The Constitution envisages that the
legislative and other measures will be the primary instrument for the achievement of
social and economic rights.”149 Therefore it is beyond the power of the Court to decide
the quantity of water that should be the minimum amount provided.

4.1.2 Reasonableness
The Court has developed an alternate standard by which to judge progressive
realization. This standard is a test of reasonableness, and was developed in the course of
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Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and others, a case
that addressed the right to housing in 2001. In this case, the Court rejected the minimum
core argument, instead focusing on whether or not the housing policy adopted by Cape
Town’s provisional government was a reasonable method to fulfill its obligations under
s26 of the Constitution.150 The reasonableness test looks at plans, policies, or programs of
the government that are designed to achieve the progressive realization of the rights
contained within the Constitution. The general evaluation of reasonableness consists of
three parts. First, the action must have “substantive measures that are comprehensive,
coherent, flexible, balance, and feasible. It must have a workable legal and
administrative infrastructure (mere framework legislation is insufficient), and it cannot
exclude large swaths of people.”151 If the plan does exclude a large portion of the
population, then it must provide a justification for why those people are not included.
Second, the rate at which the action is implemented must reflect progressive realization.
In order for the government to satisfy its constitutional obligations it must move towards
the goal as quickly as possible, but does not need to achieve the goal immediately.
Finally, the reasonableness of an action is weighed against the government’s available
resources. However, the indigent component of a plan must be implemented with more
urgency, and must be entirely government funded, therefore the state has less budgetary
discretion than with non-indigent programs. If a party sues the government to contest the
constitutionality of an action, as happened in the Mazibuko case, the burden of proof rests
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with the plaintiff.152 That is, the applicants must prove that the state’s plan is
unreasonable.
The Constitutional Court has been criticized for this approach. Critics claim that
the reasonableness test is not far-reaching enough, and does not provide grounds for
immediate relief from hardships. The minimum core approach would provide a
minimum baseline standard for the Court to enforce as a starting point for progressive
realization.153 In the case of the right to water, a minimum core approach would provide
a minimum quantity of water that the state is obliged to provide, whereas with the
reasonableness test it must only prove that it is implementing policy and infrastructure to
expand water services.

4.2 Implications for the right to water
The approach that the Constitutional Court took in the Mazibuko case, coupled
with the overarching circumstances in South Africa, has consequences for the
justiciability of right to water. One of the main reasons that the Constitutional Court cites
for rejecting the minimum core approach to socio-economic rights is that it would
interfere with the budget. The Court shies away from decisions that would influence the
macro-economic policy of the state, and the water infrastructure falls under the umbrella
of macroeconomic policy. As demonstrated earlier in this thesis, South Africa’s water
policy is influenced by its larger neoliberal economic strategy. This neoliberal economic
strategy was adopted under the pressure of globalization, and has not succeeded in
improving the conditions of those living in poverty or in the delivery of water
152
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infrastructure to all citizens.154 Rose Francis predicted in 2005 that the government’s
Free Basic Water policy would stand the test of reasonableness, stating “given that the
Constitutional Court will interpret the constitutional right to water as merely a
governmental obligation to the population rather than the right of an individual to a
specified quantity of water, the government is not legally required to provide every single
person with immediate access to potable water.”155 Justice O’Regan makes a similar
argument in Mazibuko, saying that the obligation imposed on the government under s27
(1) and (2) of the Constitution “…requires the state to take reasonable legislative and
other measures progressively to achieve the right of access to sufficient water within
available resources. It does not confer a right to claim ‘sufficient water’ from the state
immediately.”156
Why does the Constitution not give citizens the right to claim sufficient water
immediately? The government does not have the means to provide sufficient water
immediately, and even if the Court were to order it to do so, it would be unable to. Given
that the government runs public utilities under a system of full-cost recovery,157 and that
there are multiple socio-economic rights that require government funding and
implementation,158 “the lack of government institutional capacity to finance and deliver
public goods might undermine the right to water.”159 It is clear from the Mazibuko
judgment that the City of Johannesburg lacks the capacity to immediately fulfill the right
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to water, and to that end the Court asks it to demonstrate a reasonable plan for the
progressive realization thereof. The right to water can be constructed on an international
level, but when taken to enforcement at the national level in South Africa, the state lacks
the ability to enforce and deliver access to sufficient water.

4.3 Flowing Forward
More than a year of research on the topic of water rights enforcement has lead me
to a bleak conclusion. It appears that the current global economic system and natural
resources limitations make the enforcement of water rights impossible. Water is the
ultimate common resource; all people need it and yet there is not enough for all of the
demands to be met. As illustrated by this thesis, the commodification and privatization of
water contributes to its economic inaccessibility. In this section, I will discuss what
tactics are used by non-governmental organizations to promote water rights, and then
offer my opinion concerning tactics that would be more effective.
There are community, national, and international organizations that have made it
their mission to assist with access to clean water. These organizations range from the
Mvula Trust, established in 1993 in South Africa to support community-driven water and
sanitation projects160 to Charity:Water and the Global Water Initiative, which are large
international non-governmental organizations. Charity: Water works to install wells and
sanitation facilities in developing countries to provide direct relief,161 while the Global
Water Initiative builds its projects on the Integrated Water Resources Management
Approach (IWRM). This approach stresses protection of the environment, improving
160
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access to water and sanitation through community capacity building, and supports
lobbying in favor of improved water policies. 162 These organizations all work from a
grassroots based, and include community empowerment as part of their goals. Their
tactics are noble, but do not seem to generate the kind of widespread change that would
be necessary to immediately fulfill the right to water.
The trend that runs through these three examples as well as the others that I have
encountered is that they have two targets for their work. The first target is people without
access to water, the rural or urban poor that lack the infrastructure or economic ability to
easily obtain sufficient water. They are supported through community building and
technological transfer. The second target is government agencies responsible for water
policy, which are targeted through lobbying. This approach leaves out a major actor in
the water services sector: private water companies. Corporate Accountability
International, as well as the Anti-Privatization Forum that aided the applicants in the
Mazibuko case, are two organizations that have specifically targeted the privatization of
water.163 However, even in these cases the organizations approach water access from a
human rights perspective, a tactic that we saw failed in the Mazibuko case.
Water rights need to be re-examined in the context of the larger conversations that
served as a framework for this thesis. There are many different debates that serve as a
background for understanding the complex nature of enforcing the right to water, so why
are water rights activists using limited discourses in advocating for the right to water? As
we have seen with the Lesotho Highlands Water Project case, there are global processes
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at work behind development strategies and resource scarcity. The LHWP was
constructed in order to provide Johannesburg with more water because the city was
growing, and the current amount of water was not enough to support the anticipated
economic growth. In order to understand the nature of the water scarcity problem in
Johannesburg and the resulting lack of access to water experienced by Ms. Mazibuko and
the other residents of Phiri, there must be an understanding of more than the international
right to water. Scholars of water rights need to conduct further research into how global
phenomena affect the ability of individuals to access fresh water. Research must be done
on the effects of industrial agriculture in water stressed areas, and if and how efficiency
gains can be made to increase the amount of water available for personal use. If the
amount of water used by agriculture is protected, then why is it protected? Scholars must
delve deeper into the politics around water use, as well as the science of hydrological
systems. Are large inter-basin transfers such as the LHWP an effective remedy for water
shortages? Is there a future in desalinization programs? There are only a few of the
many questions that need to be asked, and are being asked, about the right to water.
Although a right to water can be constructed from international human rights law,
it is impossible to enforce the right to water in a developing country that employs a
neoliberal development strategy and faces scarce resources. This thesis has demonstrated
the limits of a human-rights approach to ensuring universal access to clean water, but it
has also begun the search for a new approach to enforcing the right to water.
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